Each method of communicating ideas is "a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the "differing natures , values, abuses and dangers" of each method.
Gregory Lee Johnson made his point by buming a flag in Dallas. 7 But does the programming of Lucifer itself-\vriting the computer software or codefa ll within "speech" or the "press" as did Johnson 's activity? 8 First Amendment doctrine "has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First Amendment to unique forum s of express ion." 9 The First Amendment generally forbids laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 10 While the courts and commentators have spared littl e ink m providing content to the limits of govemment activity with respect to speech and the press, they have paid considerably les s attention to a logicall y anterior question : What is it, exactly, that "bring[s] the First A m endment into play?"
11
When the forum of communication involved is the spoken or \Vfitten word, courts and commentators do not linger long on this question. 12 Called "relatrvel y minor First Amendment doctrine ,"
13 the threshold question may seem but a smalli sh bump on the road to substanti ve First Amendment analysis-a procedural footnote to the grand tenets of "time, place, and manner" or "balancing tests."
14 Further, even when the threshold question is considered, it is often read as an epithet announcing a result rather than as the product of careful analysis. 14. See. e.g. , id. at 1260-70 (discussing the tim e, place, and manner test). 15 . See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) (assuming First Amendment protection for draft card burning in holding that the government's interest in restricting it was justifi ed under the Constitution). Professor Tribe notes that "the di stinction between speech and conduct must be seen at best as announcing a conclusion of the Court, rather than as summarizing in any way the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusion." TRJBE, s upra note 12, at 827. quires three generalized steps. First is the threshold questiOn: Is freedom of speech and the press implicated? If so, the analysis mo ves to the second step: What is the le vel of scrutiny to be applied to the government action at issue? Once the court answers this question, the third step controls: Does the justification for the regulation meet the scrutiny imposed? In effect, any one of these steps may be dispositive. Laws that do not implicate the First Amendment do not receive First Amendment review.
16 A "strict scrutiny" standard, in most cases, will be the death knell for the regulation at issue.
17
And even if it does not fully resolve the issue, the threshold question affects governmental activities by determining whether content-neutral justifications must be made for the regulation .
18
The threshold issue typically attracts attention when new modes of communication are used-and regulated. Union picketers are charged under a state antipicketing law.
19 A young man bums his draft card, 20 defaces the American flag, 21 or bums it. 22 The development and expansion of technology in particular raises the threshold question. Computer programmers attempt to export encryption software code; 23 our Debra and her Lucifer software raise similar questions about what qualifies as speech.
This note investigates the operation of the First Amendment threshold test in an effort to determine the "law of software." Part I identifies two separate methods of threshold analysis employed by the Supreme Court: 16 . See. e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J. , concurring) (explaining the limitations of First Amendment applicability); Arcara v. Cloud Books , Inc., 478 US. 697 , 707 (1986) (holding that a statute permitting the closure of a bookstore where solicitation of prost itution took place did not implicate the First A mendment).
17. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,395-96 (1992) (holding that a "hate crime" ordinance prohibiting the display of a symbol calculated to arouse anger on the basis of race was not narrowly tailored-and therefore constitutionally invalid-because it was content-specific); Spence, 418 U.S. at 411-15 (1974) (per curiam) (finding that affixing a peace symbol to a flag did not significantly impair the state's interest in preserving the flag's physical integrity).
18. Compare Arcaro, 478 U.S. at 706-07 (declining to apply First Amendment principles to "a public health regulation of general application"), with Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (allowing the government to prevent camping in a park for contentneutral reasons). One s uspects that the resolution of the threshold question will detem1ine, at the very least, whether the case is resolved in pretrial motions or at trial. ontological and teleologica!Y+ The ontological mode-also properly referred to as "mode-specific"-looks to the activities of the speaker as a gUi de to whether free expression is implicated. If the speaker is "speaking," then the First Amendment is triggered. 25 The ontological analysis encompasses more than the speech-conduct distinction, however. The Supreme Court also uses the medium of communication chosen by the speaker as the basis for the threshold detem1ination.
26 The teleological mode, on the other hand, makes no reference to the speaker's activities or choice of medium. Instead, it focuses squarely on whether the governmental interests that support the regulation are related to the suppression of tree expression. 27 If these interests are not related to free expression, then the analysis is complete; the First Amendment is not implicated.
Part II analyzes the law of software as applied to this threshold framework. The teleological mode, of course, rejects any categorization of mediums, and thus lends no guidance to (or support for) a law of software. However, application of the ontological approach to the particularities of computer software exposes fundamental weaknesses in the mode of analysis, leading to a questioning of this approach, at least as applied to new media. A threshold focus on the mode of communication-the expressive content of the speaker's activities or the medium in which they are conducted-is unlikely to provide strong protection for First Amendment values in the new 24 Le st any readers have lingering susp icions about the existence of a First Amendment threshold question, thi s part will address that issue before moving further. The underlying logic of thi s point is that courts can uphold regulations alleged to be prohibited by the First Amendment "on the ground that they need not be evaluated acc ording to First Amendment standards," and they can uphold the very same regulations because they "withstand consti tutional scrutiny." 28 Therefore, some sort of boundary criteria must be established to detennine whether First Amendment standards will be brought to bear. The Supreme Court has repeatedl y recogni zed thi s threshold determination, both expressly and implicitly. In Sp ence v. Washington, 29 The crux of the speech-conduct distinction is that while "speech" IS highly protected, "conduct" is not. 42 Cal. 1996) , came cl ose to stating this argument. The District Court noted that, because the plaintiffs "encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather than in English," expressi veness of conduct need not be considered. !d. at 1434-3 5. But rather than obviating the threshold question, the District Court was choosing a particular form of the ontological mode of threshold analysis. That is, instead of evaluating the speaker 's conduct, the court evaluated th e speaker's choice of medium. Because software code could be printed out (or "written"), it was thus evaluated to be speech. See id.
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) . In this case, the majority stated th at "we cannot accept the view that an apparentl y limitl ess variety of conduct can be la beled 'speech ' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." !d. at 376. But as Professor Ely noted, this statement was a "false lead" to the true holding of the 0 'Brien Court, which mo ved on to focus on th e interests of the reg ulation as the thres hold question. See El y, supra note 2, at 1494-96 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
42. See Johnson, 491 U.S . at 406 ("[T]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting th e written or spoken word.").
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[Vol.51 :387 "to determine whether [the speaker's] activity was suffic iently imb ued w ith elements of communication" to tri gger the protections of the F irst Amendment.43 In making this determination, the Court has asked whether (1) " [a]n intent to convey a particulari zed message was present," and (2) "the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by tho se who viewed it." 44 If both el ements are present, then the Court will apply F irst Amendment analys1s. 45 Unfortunately , fundamental fallacies underli e the speech-conduct dichotomy. It simply ca nnot be disputed that "[t]o some extent express ion and action are al ways mingled; most conduct includes elements of both ." 46 In fact, as Professor Ely has pointed out: " [B]uming a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, l 00% action and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communication, and no communication that does not result from conduct."
Moreover, the test is quite difficult to administer in practice; it is not at all clear where on the spectrum of speech versus conduct a particular ac ti vity may fall. While I cannot be prevented from publicly speaking or writing "Wagner fo r Congress," blasting the same on loudspeakers at three in the morning may be regul ated. 49. Under Spence, the flag burner would have to show tha t th e "contex t in w hich [the flag was burned) for purposes of exp ression" was suc h that those who viewed it would be likel y to unders tand the message. Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10. A defacer could obviate th is prong of the anal ysis by,
for exampl e, spray-painting " Impeach Clinton. "
analysis is also clearl y subject to problems of characterizati on, as conduct "cannot be labeled 'speech ' whenever the person engagin g in the conduct intends th ereby to expre ss an idea. " 50
The Court ap peared to drop the speech-conduct di stinction after Sp ence, re surrecting it only in Texas v. Johnson fifteen years later . 5 i More recently, the Court criticized the first factor (the "particul arized message" requirement) of the Sp ence framework in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group. 52 Justice Souter spoke for a unanimous court w hen he stated tha t "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condi tion of constitutional protection, whi ch if confin ed to express ions conveying a ' particularized message, ' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll. " 53
In addition to the speech-conduct dichotomy, which has attTac ted scholarly attent ion , 5~ the Court has used another version of the ontological approach to the threshold question. This approach fo cuses upon the medium of communication chosen by the speaker, which triggers (or does not trigger) First Amendment protec tions depending on whether the medium is traditional ly and familiarly considered to be one which implicates th e First Amendment.55 Rather than receiving protection because of their content, these types of expression are favored because their m edium is favored or, in other words, 55. Professor Tribe notes several "activities that have histori call y been recogn ized as inextricably intertwined wi th speech or petiti on ... all of these ac tiviti es might variously be described, wi thout special illuminati on, either as 'speech' or as 'conduct,' but all must be recogni zed as acti vities of special first ame ndm ent significance." TRIB E, supra note 12, at 829-3 0. He includes in thi s list outdoor distribution of leafl ets, doo r-to-door political canvassing, solicitati on of contributions, mailbox-stuffing, picketing, civil rights demonstrations, boycotts , communicating with the government, and putting up outdoor posters and signs. See id. bec ause they "refl ect an exercise of these basic constitu tional ri ghts m their most pri stine and classic fom1."
56
The medium-specific version of the ontologi cal threshold analysis requires courts first to evaluate the medium through which the allegedly infringed speech is being transmitted. In Hurley, the Court began its analysis by noting that " [p ] arades are thus a fom1 of expression, not just motion ." 57 In Jvfe tromedia . In c. v. Sa n Diego , 53 the Co urt highlighted the " uniqueness of each med ium of expression" by noting that " [ e ]ach method of communicating ideas is a ' law unto itself."' 59 The idea here-at least with respect to the threshold analysis-is that there is a "list" of traditi onal or famili ar m ediums. This raises several important points.
First, the " list" of medi a given such favorable treatment has changed over time. 60 Take the case of motion pi ctures. In 1915, the Court, in i\lfutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm ission, 6 1 rejected a challen ge to an exp lic itl y content-based licen sing statute. The statute allowed only film s of a "moral , educati ona l or amusing and harmless character" to be approved. 6 =' Notin g first that films "may be used for evil ," 63 the Court engaged in a b it of negative medium-specific analysis: Movies were "not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded .. . we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of publi c opinion. 59. !d. at 50 1 & n.S. It should, of co urse, be noted at the outset that th e " freq ue nt refrain" of medium-specificity is not unique to threshold an alysis . Much of the "categorizi ng" of substantive First Am endment law is closely related to the medium in question. For example, the Court accords lo wer constitutional protec tion to speech conducted over the w irel ess broadcast medium. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-40 I ( 1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine, w hich requires that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side should be given fa ir coverage 115, 128 , 131 ( 1989) (finding statutory ban on certain telephone messages uncons titutional). The importance of the medium in the ultimate substantive analysis further supports the proposition that in many cases the medium will be critical to the thres hold determination as well.
60. Professor Post argues th at a medium should be added to th e list when th e social conventions surroundin g the medi um create constitutionall y meaningful rela tions hips between th e med ium and ideas. See Post, supra note 13, at 1253 -54. This is as sound a reason as any, though the Court is probably not that analytical about what is, by nature, a strikingly ad hoc proposition .
61 Second, the medium-specific approach can be as easily u sed to "downgrade" purported expression as to protect it . For example, courts do not consider the First Amendment to be implicated by "products" such as aeronautical charts. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 68 the Ninth C ircuit expl a ined that aeronautical charts were in a special class of materials-a " medium, " so to speak-that are more like physical products than books. 69 Third, the medium-speci fic approach is as likely to be arbitrarily applied as the speech-conduct distinction . On the one hand, City ofDallas v. Stanglin 70 te1l s us that "recreational dancing" is not a protected expressive acti vity.71 On the other, the plurality opinion in Barnes V. Glen nzeatre, lnc 72 stated that nude barroom dancing is "within the outer perimeters of the F irst Amendment." 73 Clearly, there is ample room within the medium-specific framework for judicial value judgmcnts.7 4 However, the essential failing of the medium-specific approach is that, by its very nature, it will protect only orth odox mediums of communication. "There's truth in the old saw that familiarity breeds contempt: nobody goes to Speakers' Corner to listen. " 75 65. 343 u.s. 495 (1952 . It is not difficult to imagine ho w the argument might proceed for such charts. The cartographer would avow an intent to convey a message (perhaps the message of the safety and of the enjo yme nt of fl yi ng) and wo uld attempt to show how the message is particul arly developed. He or she would then argu e, rather plausibly, that the consumers of the charts wo uld be ab le to discern this message. 78 Thus, the Court explicated a second mode of threshold analysi s, a teleological one, which is wholl y separate from the activities of the speaker.
79 Thi s method asks whether the re gulat10n is intended to suppress free expression. If it is not, the First A mendment is simply not implicated. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Barn es v. Glen Th eatre, Inc. , explicitly noted the procedural nature of the teleological inquiry:
76. Ind eed, one must consider fla g burning, if not draft card burning, p:uades , and music, to be recent additions to th e " lis t" of medi a that implicate the First Amendment. It remains an open question whether th e inevi tabl e enlargement o f th e scop e of th e medium-spec ific threshold will re nd er th is mode of anal ys is useless.
77. 505U S.377(1 992). 78 . !d. at 391.
.
In th e tel eological mode of analysis , the thresh old qu es tion is necess aril y the primary question asked in a substantive balancing of the interes ts of the government and speaker. Therefore, co urts using the teleological approach will, in effect, "co mpress" the anal ys is into two interrelated steps rather th an three: The court first determines whether or not the regulation is related to free exp ression and then determines the leve l of scrutiny to be applied. See. e.g. , id. at 391-96 (fi nding that an ordinance suppressing fighting words that provoke violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender is content-based and facially unconstituti onal).
This line of analysis is related to the doctrine of impern1issibl e motives, where the "substantive mo ti va tion" tes t is primaril y concerned with viewpoint discrimination. 83 is anoth er example of th e teleolog ical approach to threshold analysi s. Rej ecting a claim by a newspaper of First A mendm ent immuni ty from state promi ssory estoppel Jaws, the Court noted that the "Minnesota doc trine of promi ssory estoppel is a law of general applicabili ty . It does not target or single out the press." 8 .J Thus, the First Am endm ent did not apply. 85 Whil e a strict teleological approach might be criti cized for providing too little protecti on to speech, 86 the evidence to date does not entirely support this view. At least five opinions have utilized the teleologi cal threshold approach . In two, the thresho ld test tri ggered the protecti on of the First Amendment and the Court struck down the regulation at issue. 87 More general criticisms of a purpose-based threshold test are similar to those enunciated against the substanti ve moti vati on analysis used in First 80. 501 U.S. 560, 578 (1 99 1) (qu otin g Com munity fo r Creati ve Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J. , dissenting)).
81. See id. at 573-76. Justi ce Scalia drew support for this proposi tion fro m th e Court' s decisions relating to th e free exercise of religi on. See id. at 579 (citing Employment Di v., Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990) (holding th at general la ws not specificall y targeted at reli gious practices did not require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they dimini shed some people 's ability to practice th eir reli gion)).
82 Amendment viewpoint discrimination cases. 88 In Palm er v. Thompson , 89 Justi ce Black outlined the basic objections to motivation analysis: First, it is ex treme ly diffi cu lt for a court to ascert ain th e m otiv ation , o r co ll ection o f different m otiv ati ons, that li e behind a legi s lative ena ctment ... . It is diffi c ult o r imp os si b le for any court to determin e th e "sol e" or " dominant" moti vat ion behin d the c hoices of a g roup of legisl ators. Furthermore, th ere is an ele men t of futility in a judici al attempt to in validate a law because of th e b ad mot ives o f its s upp orters. If the law is struck down for th1 s re ason , rather th an because of its fac ial content or effect, it wou ld presumably be valid as so on as the legis lature or re levant governing body repass ed it for different rcasons. 90 While the analysis of whether a particular enactment is intended to affect the communication of ideas may be more straightforward than di scerning an impermi ssible motive in an otherwise permissible regulation, it cannot be questioned that this challenge will be significant. Indeed, as Professor Ely notes, "[I]t will be next to impossible for a court responsibl y to conclude that a decision was affected by an unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to articulate a plausible legitimate explanation for the acti on taken. " 9 1 But this is no reason not to undertake the inquiry-in fact, many regulations will not have an equally plausible alternative explanation. 92 As such, teleological analyses seem equally likely to yield good results as any alternative. The Barn es law, on the other hand, is a much closer case. Whi le the s im ple proscription of public nudity would appear to have less to do w ith speech and more to do with the social interest in order and morality, evidence that the state had not applied the statute to nudity as part of pl ays, ballets, or operas hints at a motive with First Amendment implications. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
II. THE MISTAKES OF MEDIUM: THE PRES ENT STATE OF THE LAW
However, difficult factual scenarios do not obviate th e discussion. The Barnes case would be equally difficult from a threshold perspective in either ontological approac h. controls on encryption software-specifically source code and object code . 94 While the fed eral regulation s 95 do not restrict the export of software in written material , like books, they do restrict software exports in "machine readable" form.
96
The first case to be decided was Karn v. United States D epartment of State. 97 Karn challenged the re strictions on the international trade of his computer diskette containing cryptographic software samples, claiming that th e regulatory scheme imposed by the Arn1s Export Control Act was an impennissible prior restraint on free speech. 98 In considering the defendant' s motion for summary judgment, the court made no explicit ruling on the threshold question, though it assumed for the purposes of the decision that the medium of source code may indeed trigger the protections of the First Amendment 99 Nonetheless, the court granted the summary judgment motion, holding that th e government's rationale, not the forn1 of speech or expression, controls the level of scrutiny. 100 The court then applied the 0 'Brien 94. Source code is computer code und ers tandable by humans. lt is where the initial creation of the computer program takes place. In order to be understood ("run") by a computer, source code must be conve rted into object code. This conversion is achieved by specialized computer programs known as compilers. These compilers take source code written in a specified language and co nvert (o r "compile") it into object code. Typically, compilers are specifically designed for a particular processor, since most processors usc slightly diffe rent patterns (or "instructions") to ac comp lish th eir tasks. Source code, on the other hand , is more versatil e. As long as a compiler is available for a particular processor, the source code can be used to create a working program for that machine.
Digital object code is the fund amental language, or code, of the computer, and is the building block for all computer codes. At root, all computer processors operate using a series of Is and Os. The patterns of Is and Os in object code represent the alphanumeric characters used in the source code. The sequence and patterns of the Is and Os cause different responses from the computer. In general, object code cannot be read and understood by humans-it is the exclusive domain of the computer. 96. Given that the "wri tten" software could be typed or scanned into computer-usable form, this distinction raises many questions. Apparently, the government is only interested in slowing down the international spread of encryption software, and deems that export via printed matter imposes enough obstacles to suit this purpose. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at I 0 (noting that m ac hine readable media makes encoding by foreign intelligence sources much easier).
97. 925 F. Supp. I. 98. See id. at 9. The software was also printed in the definitive book on cryptography, BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOG~>\PHY 623-73 (2d ed. 1996). The government did not object to the export of the book. See Karn , 925 F. Supp. at 3.
99. See id. at 9-10. 100. See id. at 10 (explaining that if the regulation were content-specific it would be "presumptively invalid," but if it were content-neutral the government can justify the regulation if other criteria are met).
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[Vol. 51:3 87 test, and found the government interest to be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 10 1 The court let the restriction stand.
The Kam decision appears to have passed lightly over the threshold question and JUmped immediately to substantive anal ysi s using the 0 'Brien test. By mo ving straight to th e analysi s of the regulation , the Karn court found it unnecessary to resolve the status of software code under the First Amendment. 102 Under R.A. V and O'Brien, the cour1 noted , the government 's rationale for the restriction is determinative. 103 The best reading of the case, then, is that the court used a teleological threshold test in place of the assumed-away ontological test. By focusing squarely upon the intent and reach of the governmental action, the court thus avoided the fallacies of the ontological, medium-specific threshold analysi s. 10 ·
The Bernstein v. United States Dep artment of State
105 decision is not so successful at avoiding such fallacies. While the basic fact pattern is quite similar to Karn, 106 the Bernstein court explicitly ruled that source code is speech for the purposes of the First Amendment, 107 noting that "Bernstein's encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather than in English."1 08 The court's analysi s is plagued by several fundamental fallacies.
First, the B ernstein court's rush to formalism on the threshold question effectively disconnects the rationale for the decision from the support of First 10 1. The court held: The defend ants are not regul atin g the export of the di skette becau se of the expressive content of the comments and or source code , but instead are regulating because of the belief that th e combination of encryption sourc e code on machine readabl e media will make it easier for foreign intelligence sources to encod e their communi cati ons. Cal. 1996) . As of the date this article went to press , Bernstein was pending (after argument) on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. While the ultimate outcome of Bernstein may provide furth er clarity for the law of software described in this article, it does not affect the more general argument that the lower court's formalistic analysis is deeply flawed.
106. Bernstein, a graduate student at U.C. Berkeley at the time of the 1995 filing (he is now a professor), wanted to publi sh his own encryption software program, Snuffle, over the Internet and share the software with colleagues overseas. Second, the court applied a medium-specific threshold test, but greatly abstracted the selection of the medium. The court reasoned that because software is recorded by means of langua ge, it is therefore "written word." 110 And while few would contend that the "written word" is not a t-aditionally protected medium of expression suffi cient to trigger the Fi rst Amendment, 111 the selection of "written word" rather than "source code" or "software" as the appropriate analytic medium begs the question . Given a sufficient level of abstraction, many things might look like the "wri tten word." More to the point, howe ver, is the converse: Given an increasin g level of abstraction , many "traditionally" protected modes of expression begin to lose their clar- 113. To be fair, the relatively thin Supreme Court doctrine regarding th e medium-specific analysis teaches little about the level of abstraction issue. But th e contours of a possible resolution might be discerned. In Hurley , the Court probably chos e to define the activity as marches or parades rath er th an walking or gatherings because the challenged statutory ac tion was directed at parades. The parade had regulat01y significance-it was the nexus of the dispute and the locus of the purported expression. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi sexu al Group, 515 U.S 557, 568-69 (1995). A reasonabl e standard for the proper level of abstraction may therefore be th e le ve l which has regul atory significance. In Bernstein, the regulation targeted cryptographic software (or object code and source code). See Bernstein , 922 F. Supp. at 1429; International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XIII(b)(I) ( 1998). That is where the impacted mode of communication lies.
114. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the effec t of basing the threshold test upon the medium of the "written word" is such that the case does not end up lending much support to th e propo-ence to those protections of the Copyright Act is profoundl y inappropriate. 122 Whether a particular software product may be protected under the Copyright Act is simply not rele vant to First Amendment analysis.
The court in Junger v. Daley 123 steered an approximate middle path between the Karn and Bernstein decisions. Holding that "although encryption source code may occasionally be expressive, its export is not protected conduct under the First Amendment," 124 the Junger court perfom1ed a two-tier ontological analys is: first, a medium-based analys is of encryption source code; and second, a speech-conduct analysis of the exporter 's activities . While at first glan ce thi s bifurcated ontological analysis may seem promising, a closer look exposes a fa miliar set of weaknesses .
Initi a lly, the court 's medium-based analysis assumed a seemingly limitless number of mediums within the "medium" of software code: "Certain software is inherently expressive . .. . other software is inherently functional. " 125 Finding source code for encryption software to b e especially functional rather than expressive, the court noted that "[m]ore than describing encryption, th e software carries out the function of encryption . ... In doing thi s function , the encryp ti on software is indistinguishable from dedicated computer hardware that does encryption." 126
The parsing of the " medium" of software code does little to improve the failing of medium-based analyses . 127 First, the opinion continues to condition First Amendment protection on the choice of medium. 128 To the Junger court, choices within the software genre will determine the outcome rather than the choice of software as a medium of expression. This is no less troublesome than a broader categorization, of course: Decisions "approving" certain forms of software code as First Amendment mediums will sti ll underprotect new, unlitigated forms. 1 29
In distinguishing among apparent sub-mediums in software code , the Junger court pointed to the functional identity between encrypted source 122. There is another, perhaps as damag ing, arg um ent against the use of copyright a nalogies in this contex t: It pla ys straight into th e hands of the "func tion al" argument. That is, the so-call ed "useful arti cles" exc eption to copyright law, codified in 17 U.S .C. § 101 (1994 ( & Supp. 1996 code and dedicated computer hardware. 130 This , of course, is not particularly helpful; software code, by definition, perfom1s the function of instructing co mputer hardware to act. The more important (and interesting) part of thi s anal ysis is that the court based its dec is10n in part on th e results of the source code-that is, the acts that the softwa re seeks to have the hardware perform. The court seemed to say that bec au se encryption code is not protec ted by the F irst Amendment, the so ftw are that "carries out the function of encryp tion" does not receive uniform protecti on 131 Significantly, the focus on results implicitly removes the "medium" question to a fom1 of conduct analysis. That is, the issue becomes whether the results of the software code are expressive or simply functional.
However, comparing expression ve rsus fu nctionality for software is no less difficult than measuring speech versus conduct for human behavior. 132 A software-hardware combination that performs encryption is quite likely to be both expression and function-bo th the act of encrypting and a state ment about encryption policy. Again, the undifferentiated whole. 133 After determining that encryption so urce code is rarely expressive, the Junger court moved to a more traditional speech-conduct analysis of the act of exporting encryption source code . Applying Spence, the court determined that the export of source code does not convey an unmistakable m essage, ostensibly because the code itself is not sufficiently expressive. 134 This, of course, is ontology upon ontology. In essence, the Junger opinion concludes that because the purported speaker chose an unexpressive medium of communication, transmitting the purported expression cannot be speech. The choice of medium is again dispositive; the speech-conduct outcome is predetermined.
In the end, Junger upheld the export regulations for reasons as questionable as the Bernstein court's opposite conclusion. 135 Although the court recognized the fallacy of Bernstein's "speech is writing" analysis, 136 and focused instead on the functionality of the medium of source code, this func·· tionality determination-as merely a different fom1 of medium-based analysis-is little better than the misguided formalism used by the Bernstein court.
Neither the Kanz nor the B ernstein case directly addressed the applic ation of computer software to the oth er ontological mode of thre shold anal ysis: the speech-conduct distinction . 137 As noted above , the spe ech-conduct distinction rests upon the fallacy th at the ex pressive elements in any action can be separated from th e conduct. 138 As Junger amply demonstrates, there is no reason to belie ve that software \viii have any special immunity from thi s problem. Indeed , if there ever was conduct that was an "undifferentiated whole" of action and expression , the use and operation of computer code would seem to be it. 139 The hypothetical programmer Debra is both acting and expre ssing when she releases Lucifer onto the Internet; trying to separate the two el ements of her activity wo uld be no easier than it would for the burning of draft cards.
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The analysis of software under the speech-conduct distinction is problemati c because computer code is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, functional. Thi s inherent, and possibly overwhelming, fun ctional aspect serves to undennine a speaker's claim that the development or us e of computer software is intended to convey a particularized message . If Johnson had been burning hi s fla g for wannth, or O'Brien using his draft card to start hi s barbecue, the Court would have been hard-pressed to find sufficient elements of expression to warrant First Amendment protection. The Bernstein court dismissed this argument as "immaterial," comparing computer software to recipes, instructions, and do-it-yourself manuals, which it noted are also speech.
141 But the analogies don ' t fit. Each of these examples is itself used to communicate infonnation between people; so ftw are, to the extent it can be considered a set of instructions, communicates only to machines. While it is true that there is no exception to the First Amendment for useful speech, w this argument presupposes the existence of speech. After all, the First Amendment does not protect products. 143 137. The go ve rnment's primary contention in Bem slein appears to have bee n that software itse lf was conduct rather than speech, and could thus be regulated . See Bernstein v. United States Dep ' t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1996). As I demonstrate bel ow, this was not th e most helpful appro ach. 13 8. See notes 42-50 supra and ac companying text. 139 . Thi s statement sets as ide the obvious d istincti on between th e actual software code (s ource or obj ect) and the co mm enls , if any, inse rt ed into th e sou rce code to make it more readab le for humans. Comments, which add nothing to the operation or function of th e software , would be f•1 ll y protec ted by the First Amendment irrespective of the status of the software itself.
140 As thi s note has demonstrated, the "law of software'' is still un settled . The three cases that have addressed the issue are split in their ultimate holdings as far as the First Amendment status of source code. These de cisions are undercut by a seri es of fallacies and misunderstandings. The vvildly divergent holdings and troublesom e analyses of Bernstein and Junger demonstrate that the already weakened ontological approach to First A mendment analysi s cannot support the weight of new mediums of communication , and that software is not-and should not be-"a law unto itself."l.J.J
The teleological mode of analysis is a more analytically sound method for evaluating the scope of First Amendment protection for software. Thi s method , of course, tell s us nothing about the protection given to the medium of computer softw are , except that software will receive neither fa vorable nor unfavorable treatment. Furthermore, a teleological method of analysis will neither hinder nor help software 's status as a developing technology . By not according special constitutional status to different forms or types of software, the law avoids distorting the market for software and related technologies.
However attractive it might be in the abstract to develop a " law of software"-to perhaps once and for all put software beyond the scope of government regulators---<:areful analysis reveals that the best law of software is no law of software. Technology inexorably develops ; we simply cannot know how it will change our world or why. But we can be sure that software is far from the last new mode of communications to come down the pike. Therefore, as the Court clearly stated in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC: 14 5 "[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies ... allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes . ... Rather, aware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to [this industry], we believe it unwise and unneces sary definitely to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now ."
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In the context of computer software, focusing on the medium would be the mistake.
